Russia. Ukraine. Putin. Zelensky. NATO. The Soviet Union.
Most people had only heard about these names ten months ago when Russia announced its Special Military Operation (SMO) and proceeded to engage in Ukraine. However, the questions linger: Who began this war, what are the material interests behind it; and is this World War III? This piece will meticulously answer these questions by employing a constant agent around this dichotomy: the United States.
What is meant by the United States is not only limited to the federal government or the vasts departments of the United States, but it also includes Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), intelligence agencies, international global institutions, and military alliances led, directed, or heavily influenced by the United States foreign, economic, and cultural apparatuses. To be more specific, it also extends to ideological and geopolitical conflicts between Russia and the United States, between authoritarianism (colloquially termed as Putinism) and liberalism (liberal democracy).
What prompted the United States to conduct an illegal, unjustified coup in Kyiv in 2014, and what preceded the launching of the SMO on February 24th, 2022? It will include background information about the long-term geopolitical and ideological agenda that preceded the events of 2014 to establish nuance. It will closely follow the actors involved in the Maidan coup, the motivations behind the events, how Ukraine lost its sovereignty, the secession of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the secession of the breakaway states of Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and the Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR), and how Russia acted in response to the three regions secessions and conclude with the SMO.
It is not that Ukraine is not allowed to conduct its affairs independently but that it would be unrealistic for Ukraine to thrive without substantial external support. The irony lies in Shevtsova’s quote:
True, Russians have grown weary of the confrontation with Ukraine. As of February 2019, about 82 percent of Russians reportedly viewed Ukrainians positively. But the Russian political regime cannot risk allowing Ukraine to swim on its own (141).
However, in which direction will Ukraine swim? The United States or its geopolitical guardian, Russia?
Establishing Geopolitical and Ideological Foundations
The famous line from US Secretary of State James Baker, “not one inch eastward,” became the overarching phrase that summed up international affairs between NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and Russia. The collective West assured Gorbachev that following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there would be guaranteed respect for post-Soviet Union sovereignty and that Russia as a nation would not face infringement of those rights. (Savranskaya and Blanton).
It was not until the Clinton administration began toying with the idea that the expansion of NATO was necessary to face an unprecedented dynamic shift in post-Soviet-US relations. “Most liberals, on the other hand, favored enlargement, including many key members of the Clinton administration” (Mearsheimer 2014). This strategy prompted the United States to negate established assurances and employ an offensive strategy against Russia.
John Mearsheimer was quick to explain this as Putin’s reaction to the possible expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to include Ukraine. The post-Cold war NATO enlargement process started in the mid-1990s with invitations issued to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, and official talk about extending NATO to include Ukraine began in 2008 (Marten 189).
To step into Russia’s shoes, an ever-encroaching world power on Russia’s doorstep would incite at least some retaliation.
Historically, Ukraine is considered a military hotspot in which “east and central Europe existed primarily as ‘the borderlands’ over which they competed in occasional geopolitical struggles” (Hagen 660-661). Ukrainian colloquially refers to Ukrainian peoples as the frontiersmen (Hagen 670). Understanding what Ukraine means to Russia inversely invokes insight into its geopolitical insignificance to America.
Ukraine is the Wild West, considered the great barrier for the Russian people. Russia underwent countless military invasions, ranging from the Poland-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Napoleon Bonaparte’s France, the Allied Invasion of Russia during the Bolshevik Revolution, the 1941 Nazi invasion, and today NATO. The playful rebuttal but severe outlook on any foreign entity speculating about interfering in Russia-Ukraine affairs is similar to poking a bear’s cub and wishfully thinking the bear will not respond accordingly.
However, the geopolitical reality between Russia and the United States reveals revelations of ideological distinctions. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the infamous coined term ‘shock therapy’ was introduced under Boris Yeltsin with the domestic policies of perestroika and glasnost. Despite mainstream academics and media heads voicing their overall approval of politically and economically ‘reconstructing’ (which translates to liberalizing) policies, the Russian elites did not reap what they sow - unless it was in their pockets.
As standards of living and conditions for the Russians exponentially declined with mass death, poverty, prostitution, and drugs, the excitement of Russia following the footsteps of the United States dramatically shifted when this so-called ‘opening of Russia’ to the world market and economy to swaths of wealth and freedom never materialized.
[A]t the individual level, with pro-Western reforms is positively associated with considering the United States a threat to security and order in Russia . . . it reflects an ideological (idealistic), rather than a purely material, reaction to the social and economic collapse that followed the reforms (Sokolov, Inglehart, Ponarin, Vartanova and Zimmerman 545).
The shift was due to Russian liberal psychosis finally meeting reality in a rude awakening; the restructuring of Russia’s political and economic models created terrible conditions, but the basis of this ideological split was that the fever had reached its peak. Russia could not afford to negate its historical relevance within the models of liberalism - whether in politics, economics, or culture. Moreover, the attacks on Russian identity and civilization sparked the perceived threat to its security.
To seque into the contemporary war between the United States and Russia, a Luhansk citizen will suffice to explain how deep this ideological battle goes:
It seems to me that all of these problems that we have in Ukraine today – drugs, homosexuality, crime – have all come from the West. We didn’t have these problems before all these changes started taking place (qtd. in Gentile 219).
Victor Yanukovych
The mainstream narrative dictates the trope that all of the events since 2014 can mostly, if not all, entirely be blamed on the Russian government. But to understand the current war, it’s necessary to explore the political atmosphere of Ukraine’s Victor Yanukovych’s election run and presidency that lasted from his win in 2013 to his ousting in 2014. It will also explore the ranging connections between foreign-backed actors within Ukraine and the motivations for backing them against Yanukovych.
Dubbed the “pro-Russia” candidate, Yanukovych faced unfair treatment from the Ukrainian Right and the international media. For a candidate to be called ‘pro-Anything’ paints a black-and-white picture of where the candidate stands. In this case, it only presumes that whatever Yanukovych does will only benefit Russia, was recommended by Russia, or can only harm Ukraine. A smear concerning this dull political framework applied to Yanukovych renders both nations’ historically complex geopolitical, economic, and military relationships futile and one-sided. Instead, this piece will approach with an objective lens and include any significant external factors that swayed Yanukovych’s decision-making during his short term.
After his win, in the early days of Yanukovych’s term, Yanukovych rejected an IMF loan and an EU association agreement. At the time, enormous pressure faced Yanukovych: Ukraine was facing a colossal debt crisis, over bloating government operations and subsidizing natural gas. The IMF offered a $15 billion loan. The EU pressured Ukraine to sign an association agreement that would ‘open borders’ to goods and ease travel restrictions with an $800 million year plan, but also came with requirements to implement harsh austerity measures to Ukraine’s economy, all at the risk of trust lost with the Russian government and potential unfavorable trade agreements with Russia (Trindle).
On the other hand, Russia counteroffered $15 billion without any demands to change Ukraine’s domestic policies with a hefty 30% discount on Russian natural gas (Trindle). Yanukovych rejected the IMF loan and the EU association agreement because he believed doing so would sell Ukraine’s natural resources to the Western banks at low prices, imposing rising expensive standards of living on the Ukrainian people by internalizing the costs on the consumer, externalizing all the profits on the loan givers. The West offered so little only to ask for so much.
The Maidan Coup
On February 18th, 2014, massive peaceful protests in Kyiv’s Maidan Independence Square occurred in response to Yanukovych signing the new Russian loan and trade agreement, clearly more beneficial to Ukraine than what the West offered (Tsygankov 284).
Later that day, neo-Nazis from the Right Sector party and Svoboda party obtained weapons and dominated communication networks and social media, all funded and backed by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a well-known CIA front - only to transition the color revolution from a peaceful one to a violent uprising against the Yanukovych administration within a day (Macleod 2022). On the ground reported that the Ukrainian police began battling in firefights against
[W]ell-trained extremists rather than ordinary demonstrators. Wearing black masks, helmets, some also equipped with bulletproof vests, they pelted riot police with rocks and Molotov cocktails, as well as shooting fireworks (#EuroMaidan revolution).
By the second day, the House of Labor Unions became set on fire - the office of the largest trade unions in the country. The neo-Nazi brigade set more buildings on fire, along with more police clashes and shots fired between the neo-Nazis and the Ukrainian police. The next day, February 20th, became known as Bloody Thursday, known for the most deaths and violence. The rioters ignored a truce: snipers shot at local authorities and the civilian protestors in the early morning. More than 100 people died that day.
A phone call held between Catherine Ashton, the EU foreign affairs chief, and Ermas Paet, the Estonian foreign minister, revealed that Paet said that the
[S]nipers responsible for killing police and civilians in Kiev last month were protest movement provocateurs rather than supporters of then-president Viktor Yanukovych (MacAskill).
Finally, the last day of the riots was the day of unfair negotiation agreements. Yanukovych agreed to give in to the violent rioters’ demands, with the intent to launch a new presidential election, a return to the 2004 Constitution, forbid all law enforcement to use their weapons, return all Ukrainian military away from Kyiv, with more than 4/5ths of the ruling party parliament not showing up to vote for the day.
The rioters continued to threaten to escalate another round of bloodshed unless Yanukovych stood down immediately, to which he fled the capital the following night due to the death threats. The consensus amongst the population was undeniably chaotic, as “The new government in Kiev lacked popular support and legitimacy in the absence of popular elections” (Tsygankov 285).
The violent riots exploded in Western media, and Mearsheimer could not deny the reality of the situation and agreed with Putin saying, “the illegal overthrow of Ukraine’s democratically elected and pro-Russian president—which he rightly labeled a ‘coup’” was in direct opposition against Yanukovych’s policy approach towards Russia. Tsygankov of the Post-Soviet Affairs admitted how carefully orchestrated the Maidan Coup was; he wrote:
Led by the opposition and supported by Western nations, the Ukrainian protest gathered momentum and reached an unprecedented level. The opposition was critical of Yanukovych’s policies at home and favored the country’s pro-European development.
Following Ukraine’s bloody and tumultuous regime change, or have it, coup d’état was a wave of widespread fear and paranoia in the majority of Russian-speaking regions.
Two weeks before the Maidan Massacre, Victoria Nuland, Assistant Secretary of State, became the crux of the Ukraine crisis in a leaked phone call with US Ambassador to Ukraine, Geoffrey Pyatt, where she said to him, “I think Yats is the guy” and planning with him how to “glue this thing.” Arseniy Yatsenyuk became the next prime minister within the week. Nuland also mentioned Svoboda Party’s Oleg Tyahnybok as one of the main actors who worked to help facilitate the operation - the same Oleg Tyahnbok infamously known for his Nazi salute picture and leader of the Svoboda Party.
I think Yats is the guy (Nuland).
Ukraine’s Sovereignty
Before this piece describes post-Maidan events, sovereignty is a critical concept to understand. After the violent removal of Yanukovych, the situation begs the question of authority: If the United States, a foreign power, carefully orchestrates the removal of a democratically elected president, and the Ukrainian people have not condoned such actions and have not voted for a popular replacement, does Ukraine maintain sovereignty?
The simple answer is no. Since 2014, Ukraine has not been sovereign. There is not much historical background to argue that it has not been a country for more than 20 years either:
Similarly, the current territorial borders of Ukraine date back only to 1954 (for Crimea) and 1939 (1945) for western Ukraine . . . Today’s Ukraine is a very modern creation, with little firmly established precedent in the national past (Hagen 667).
Conditions require that Ukraine has complete control over its affairs, but it does not. Soon after the coup, newly selected Prime Minister Yatsenuk introduced extreme austerity measures because he accepted an IMF loan ranging between $14-18 billion - which maintained similar demands to the first IMF offer to Yanukovych. Even after the presidential election win of Petro Poroshenko in June, Yatsenyuk held the PM position until November 2014. As Putin explained:
Are the Ukrainian people aware that this is how their country is managed? Do they realize that their country has turned not even into a political or economic protectorate but it has been reduced to a colony with a puppet regime? The state was privatised. As a result, the government, which designates itself as the ‘power of patriots’ no longer acts in a national capacity and consistently pushes Ukraine towards losing its sovereignty (Putin 12).
Crimea and the Donbas
In the aftermath of the violent coup of Victor Yanukovych, there were referendums held in Crimea, Donetsk, and the Luhansk oblasts. When Crimea had its referendum in March 2014, there were allegations of Russian troops, ‘little green men,’ harassing and tampering with the Crimean vote held by the local government of the Crimean people.
Russian troops were present in Crimea, but they had been present in Crimea since 1804 before the carving out of Ukraine by Vladimir Lenin in 1922. The geostrategic location of the Sevastapool is essential to Russia, which has historically always been ‘pro-Russian,’ a majority-speaking Russian population, and culturally hegemonic with Russia.
Khrushchev took Crimea away from Russia for some reason and also gave it to Ukraine. In effect, this is how the territory of modern Ukraine was formed (Putin 2).
President Putin was not dismissing Ukrainian sovereignty but reiterating a historical basis. Despite Western media and the United States alleging that the Crimean vote was illegitimate, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea was born and served as a reminder that Eastern Ukrainians, formally Slavic Russians, explicitly were against the Kyiv Junta regime propped up by the United States.
On March 18th, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARC) officially became an equal yet separate jurisdiction under Russian law and their constitution. A month later, the people held referendums in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts to become separate sovereign entities; Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and the Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR), essentially, two new countries were born in April 2014.
The people of both regions have always felt excluded from Kyiv’s central government, otherized as too Asian to be considered European or Ukrainian. Even during the war between Ukraine and the Donbas, rampant media accusations dominated the headlines that Russian militants were the frontiermen fighting against the infamous neo-Nazi battalions. However, reported on the ground:
[Were] separatist leaders and fighters in East Ukraine, despite the fact that some were Russian citizens, [they] were not the ‘little green men’ from Crimea. Most of the leaders and fighters were Ukrainian citizens: miners, small businessmen, and former military (Giuliano 514).
It is necessary to understand that the Donbas is the industrial region of Ukraine that is primarily responsible for the industrialization of the entirety of Ukraine - mainly notable for its wealth of natural resources and heavy metals. Recognizing the class conditions of the Donbas highlights a significant factor: Donbas is the center of the historical industrial proletariat (working class) that produced the necessary goods for the commonwealth of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Over time, as the West’s sphere of influence contaminated western Ukraine, they began to focus on the financial and technological industries - primarily within the consumerist sects and consulting firms.
Nevertheless, as explained before, this war is not only geopolitical but deeply ideological, as Putin recognized that the Russian-speaking people required protection from the Euromaidan Junta (Stebelsky 29). These constituents of the Donbas feel significantly misrepresented, with their livelihood threatened.
The pro-West constituency is younger, not Russian, but often includes members of other ethnic groups, well educated, more tolerant toward sexual minorities, generally more satisfied with life, and it also speaks better English. Conversely, those with pro-Russia/Soviet geopolitical identities are older, Russian, low educated, less fluent in English, intolerant, and unsatisfied with their lives (Gentile 218-219).
The war decentralized to paramilitaries is a direct attack on the ‘deemed’ non-European groups of Ukraine - Russians or Soviet sympathizers. Even as the war escalates and the media attempt to downplay neo-Nazi infestation, it is difficult to do so when Ihor Klymenko, infamous neo-Nazi oligarch, is the primary Ukrainian financier of the Azov Battalion, a neo-Nazi paramilitary - but this also applies to all Ukrainian Nazi militias.
There are four major sources for funding pro-Ukrainian paramilitary battalions: the state budget of Ukraine, non-governmental organizations, private donations and funding from oligarchs (Malyarenko and Galbreath 123).
Equating the Donbas’ military capabilities as paramilitary or Russian military adjacent simplifies the situation. Most paramilitary units are citizens of the DPR and LPR hired by Ukrainian and Russian nationals (Malyarenko and Galbreath 130).
Both authors devalue the significance of the decentralization model of the Ukrainian paramilitaries as if there are no underlying motivations to shift blame separate from the central government in Kyiv. In contrast, they attribute responsibilities that the Donbas paramilitaries are too professional and closely connected to the Russian military (Malyarenko and Galbreath 130). This kind of hypocrisy within their implications proves a double standard that stems from the liberal psychosis that privatization is blameless and complicated. However, if it is centralized, it is a culprit.
Privatization is blameless and complicated. However, if it is centralized, it is a culprit.
Even with current president Volodymyr Zelensky in 2019, Ukraine does not maintain its sovereignty.
[W]hile Ukraine itself was placed under external control, directed, not only from the Western capitals, but also on the ground, as the saying goes, through an entire network of foreign advisors, NGOs, and other institutions present in Ukraine (Putin 12).
Putin correctly condemned the underground web of foreign collaboration and external influence prominent in Ukraine, nevertheless, mind the complete control of the economy strangled by the IMF and EU austerity measures.
Conclusion: The Special Military Operation
As the neo-Nazis became well known by the non-Western world for the ethnic genocide of nearly 15,000 Russians, the DPR and LPR governments requested, on multiple instances, to be recognized by the Russian government. With the war almost marking its eighth anniversary, until February 21st, the Russian State Duma passed a bill officially recognizing both republics.
Through the sheer persistence of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), they presented the bill on February 15th, five days before Zelensky threatened to join NATO. The bill passed within 24 hours of Zelensky’s threat, with the SMO launching three days post-NATO threat.
These events did not occur in a vacuum. World War Three began all those months ago, but this particular event catalyzed the entire world to take sides. It took eight years for Russia to enter the war formally. However, if Russia truly wanted this war, they would have launched it officially eight years ago at the request and incessant dog-barking of the KPRF when they first introduced multiple bills at the peak of the Donbas genocide. It is unfair to say Russia invaded Ukraine when the Ukrainian people have not controlled the country since 2014. There will be no refrainment in saying that the United States began this war.
When Putin asked former President Bill Clinton if Russia could join NATO, he disclosed that Clinton hesitated to give an honest answer (Putin 18). Instead, Putin inferred that from the evidence he witnessed:
[F]ive waves of NATO expansion, one after another – Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary were admitted in 1999; Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2001; Albania and Croatia in 2009; Montenegro in 2017; and North Macedonia in 2020 (Putin 18-19).
In other words, blaming Russia for this war is intellectually insulting and foolish. How can Russia invade Ukraine when both regions declared independence eight years ago? How can we condemn Russia for acting out in its responsibility to defend both republics, the ARC, and Russia proper, when Ukraine threatens to join NATO - rapidly escalating tensions between the United States and Europe against Russia? Undoubtedly, Russia invoking Article 51 of the UN Charter is not only understandable but undeniably necessary to guarantee the sovereignty of Russia as it faces another European invasion of the borderlands!
In the final analysis, replacing the Germans with NATO in this short quote from Stalin will suffice:
Well, if the Germans want a war of annihilation, they will receive one!
Notes:
“#Euromaidan Revolution: 2014 Ukrainian Coup Timeline.” RT International, https://www.rt.com/news/233163-ukraine-maidan-february-timeline/.
Gentile, Michael. “West Oriented in the East-Oriented Donbas: a Political Stratigraphy of Geopolitical Identity in Luhansk, Ukraine.” Taylor & Francis Online, Post-Soviet Affairs, 3 Jan. 2015, pp. 201-223 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1060586X.2014.995410
Giuliano, Elise. “The Social Bases of Support for Self-Determination in East Ukraine.” Taylor & Francis Online, Ethnopolitics, 11 Aug. 2015, pp. 513-522, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17449057.2015.1051813?journalCode=reno20
Hagen, Mark von. “Does Ukraine Have a History?” JSTOR, Cambridge University Press, Slavic Review, Vol. 54, No. 3 (Autumn, 1995), pp. 658-673, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2501741
MacAskill, Evan. “Ukraine Crisis: Bugged Call Reveals Conspiracy Theory about Kiev Snipers.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 5 Mar. 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/05/ukraine-bugged-call-catherine-ashton-urmas-paet
Macleod, Alan. “Documents Reveal Us Gov't Spent $22m Promoting Anti-Russia Narrative in Ukraine and Abroad.” MintPress News, 4 Mar. 2022, https://www.mintpressnews.com/documents-reveal-us-ned-spent-22m-promoting-anti-russia-narrative-ukraine/279734/.
Marten, Kimberly. “Putin's Choices: Explaining Russian Foreign Policy and Intervention in Ukraine.” The Washington Quarterly, The Elliott School of International Affairs, 2015, pp. 189-204 https://cpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/blogs.gwu.edu/dist/1/2181/files/2019/03/Marten_TWQ_38-2.pdf
Malyarenko, Tetyana, and David J. Galbreath. “Paramilitary Motivation in Ukraine: Beyond Integration and Abolition.” Taylor & Francis Online, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 10 Mar. 2016, pp. 113-138, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14683857.2016.1148414?journalCode=fbss20
Mearsheimer, John J. “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault.” Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2014 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault
Nuland, Victoria, and Geoffrey Pyatt. “Ukraine Crisis: Transcript of Leaked Nuland-Pyatt Call.” BBC News, BBC, 7 Feb. 2014, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26079957
Putin, Vladimir. “Address by the President of the Russian Federation.” President of Russia, The Kremlin, 21 Feb. 2022, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67828
Savranskaya, Svetlana, and Tom Blanton. “NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard.” National Security Archive, 1 Feb. 1990, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early
Shevtsova, Lilia. “Russia's Ukraine Obsession.” Journal of Democracy, Johns Hopkins University Press, Jan. 2020, pp. 138-147 https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/russias-ukraine-obsession
Sokolov, Boris, et al. “Disillusionment and Anti-Americanism in Russia: From Pro-American to Anti-American Attitudes, 1993–2009.” ResearchGate, International Studies Quarterly, June 2018, pp. 534–547 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325998953_Disillusionment_and_Anti-Americanism_in_Russia_From_Pro-American_to_Anti-American_Attitudes_1993-2009.
Stebelsky, Ihor. “A Tale of Two Regions: Geopolitics, Identities, Narratives, and Conflict in Kharkiv and the Donbas.” Taylor & Francis Online, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 22 Jan. 2018, pp. 28-50, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15387216.2018.1428904?journalCode=rege20
Trindle, Jamila. “The Loan That Launched a Crisis.” Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy, 21 Feb. 2014, https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/02/21/the-loan-that-launched-a-crisis/.
Tsygankov, Andrei. “Vladimir Putin's Last Stand: the Sources of Russia's Ukraine Policy.” Taylor & Francis Online, Post-Soviet Affairs, 4 Feb. 2015, pp. 279-303https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1060586X.2015.1005903
“Ukraine Receives IMF Support but Must Accelerate Reforms.” IMF, IMF News, 4 Apr. 2017, https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2017/04/03/na040417-ukraine-receives-imf-support-but-must-accelerate-reforms.